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Abstract
Background: On July 22, 2011, a single perpetrator killed 77 people in a car bomb attack and a shooting spree
incident in Norway. This article describes the emergency medical service (EMS) response elicited by the two
incidents.
Methods: A retrospective and observational study was conducted based on data from the EMS systems involved
and the public domain. The study was approved by the Data Protection Official and was defined as a quality
improvement project.
Results: We describe the timeline and logistics of the EMS response, focusing on alarm, dispatch, initial response,
triage and evacuation. The scenes in the Oslo government district and at Utøya island are described separately.
Conclusions: Many EMS units were activated and effectively used despite the occurrence of two geographically
separate incidents within a short time frame. Important lessons were learned regarding triage and evacuation,
patient flow and communication, the use of and need for emergency equipment and the coordination of
helicopter EMS.
Keywords: Terrorism, Mass Casualty Incidents, Triage, Prehospital Emergency Care
Background
O nJ u l y2 2 ,2 0 1 1 ,N o r w a yw a ss t r u c kb yt w ot e r r o r i s t
attacks. In the first attack, a car bomb exploded in the
Oslo government district. The bomb comprised an
ammonium nitrate/fuel oil (ANFO) mixture or “fertiliser
bomb”. Eight people were killed in the explosion. Two
hours later, a lone gunman attacked a political youth
camp on Utøya island, approximately 40 kilometres
from Oslo, and killed 69 civilians. A single perpetrator
carried out both attacks.
The scale of the July 22, 2011 attacks and the resulting
emergency medical service (EMS) response was unpre-
cedented in Norway. The massive EMS response crossed
jurisdictional lines and involved responders from multi-
ple agencies throughout the region. In this paper, we
describe the immediate prehospital EMS response to the
July 22, 2011 attacks.
Methods
The Norwegian EMS
The backbone of the Norwegian EMS is provided by on-
call general practitioners (GPs) and ground ambulances
[1]. According to national regulations, all ambulance
units must be staffed by at least one certified emergency
medical technician (EMT) [2]. However, most units are
staffed by two EMTs, and in most urban systems, at least
one EMT is a trained paramedic. The ambulance service
is government-funded and organised under local health
enterprises. In Oslo, a physician-manned ambulance is
operational during the daytime on weekdays and is
staffed by certified or in-training anaesthesiologists.
Since 1988, a national government-funded air ambu-
lance system has provided rapid access to advanced life
support by specially trained anaesthesiologists [3,4]. This
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7 fixed-wing EMS bases, all operating 24 hours a day
[5]. All HEMS units are staffed by an anaesthesiologist
and a HEMS paramedic. Six search-and-rescue (SAR)
helicopter bases operated by the Royal Norwegian Air
Force under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice
and the Police are also an integral part of the national
air ambulance system [1]. These helicopters are also
staffed by an anaesthesiologist and a rescue-man [5]. As
back-up during non-flying weather conditions or for
incidents close to the helicopter base, all civilian and
some SAR helicopter bases use rapid response cars [6].
Twenty emergency medical communication centres
(EMCC) coordinate EMS resources and on-call GPs in
their region. Nurses who answer public emergency calls
through the national toll-free medical emergency num-
ber (113) staff the EMCCs together with EMT-trained
operators who coordinate the EMS and HEMS resources
in the region.
The Norwegian trauma care system
Norway has a three-tiered system of local, central and
university hospitals. The catchment areas for the local
and central hospitals range from 13,000 to 400,000 peo-
ple. University hospitals serve as trauma referral centres
and provide definitive care for populations ranging from
460,000 to 2.5 million [7].
EMS major incident preparedness
A standard for major incident triage does not exist in
Norway; most triage systems are confined to local sys-
tems [8]. However, a framework for the management,
organisation and coordination of major incident scenes
has been established [9]. According to this framework,
incident command is managed by a police officer. Other
branches involved are represented by their respective
branch scene commanders, and the most central are
those from the fire and rescue and EMS. An ambulance
scene commander (ASC) is responsible for coordinating
all on-scene EMS resources, and a medical scene com-
mander (MSC) is the leading medical person on scene,
who is responsible for triage and on-scene medical treat-
ment. In addition, the scene is organised with parking
and loading points for EMS vehicles and casualty-clearing
stations.
A light emergency stretcher system (LESS), developed
in the Optimal Patient Evacuation Norway (OPEN) con-
cept, is available in several EMS and SAR systems in
Norway [10]. These stretchers are stored in transport-
friendly bags of five and are insulating and radiolucent.
Within the intended function for which they were devel-
oped [10], they are intended to follow the patient from
first contact to hospital arrival, thus avoiding unneces-
sary patient manipulation.
Scene descriptions and EMS resources; Oslo
Oslo is the capital of Norway and has a population of
approximately 605,000 inhabitants. The immediate
urban area around Oslo, however, accounts for nearly
one million people. The Oslo government district is
located in the business district of Oslo and consists of
several buildings housing most of the ministries. Tradi-
tionally, the area has been open to the public, and all
nearby streets have been accessible to civilian vehicles.
The road transport time from the bomb site to Oslo
University Hospital (OUH) takes 5-10 minutes. OUH is
the major health institution in Oslo and consists of
three university hospital campuses: Rikshospitalet, Ulle-
vål and Aker (Table 1). OUH-Ullevål (OUH-U) is a
combined primary and regional referral trauma centre
that serves almost half the Norwegian population. A
combined casualty clinic and GP-staffed primary health
care facility in the Oslo business district attends to
walk-in patients and is located 2-3 minutes away from
the government district by vehicle. The ambulance
department of OUH has 15 ambulance stations and 43
ambulance units (25 units on-call day and night) in
Oslo and the surrounding municipalities. In addition, an
ambulance commander is on duty day and night in a
separate vehicle and acts as the ASC in incidents invol-
ving multiple units. The air ambulance base of OUH
with two HEMS units is located in Lørenskog, which is
just outside the city limits of Oslo. The EMCC of Oslo
and Akershus coordinate the activity of all the EMS
resources of OUH.
Scene description and local EMS resources; Utøya
Utøya island is 39 kilometres from central Oslo and lies
in the Tyrifjorden lake (Figure 1). The 0.12 square
Table 1 The distance by road from the scenes of July 22,
2011 to the Oslo University Hospital campuses and the
hospitals of the Vestre Viken Health Enterprise
Hospital Distance (km)*
Name Type Utøya island Oslo
2
Oslo University Hospital
Rikshospitalet University 34 5
Ullevål University
1 38 4
Aker University 44 5.5
Casualty clinic Local 40 1.5
Vestre Viken Health Enterprise
Ringerike Local 16 n/a
Drammen Central 43 n/a
Asker-Bærum Local 20 n/a
Kongsberg Local 90 n/a
1Dedicated trauma hospital;
2Bomb incident site
*Distances are approximate because there are several alternate routes
n/a = Not applicable because no patients were transported to this hospital
from the site
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Page 2 of 12kilometre island is owned by the youth organisation of
the Norwegian Labour Party and is known for its annual
summer camp. The island can only be reached by boat
from the mainland. A small ferry that can accommodate
one car is the only organised transport route to the
island. The shortest distance from Utøya to the main-
land is approximately 630 metres.
The Vestre Viken Health Enterprise (VVE) is responsi-
ble for the specialist health services and the EMS in the
region. The regional hospital resources and their dis-
tance to Utøya island are described in Table 1 and
depicted in Figure 1. The ambulance service in VVE has
17 ambulance stations with 24 ambulances operating
day and night and an additional 5 daytime ambulances.
T h eH E M Sb a s ea tÅ lc o v e r st h eV V Er e g i o nt o g e t h e r
with the HEMS units from OUH. The EMCC of Bus-
kerud coordinates the activity of all EMS resources of
VVE.
Environmental conditions
July 22, 2011 was a Friday during the Norwegian general
staff vacation period. In Oslo, the midday weather was
Figure 1 Map of the greater Oslo area including Utøya depicting all (H)EMS bases in the area, the hospitals and main roads.
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Page 3 of 12overcast with some light rain and a moderate north-
northeast breeze. The air temperature was between 15
and 17°C. The weather conditions in the Utøya island
area were similar, with light rain throughout the after-
noon. The air temperature was between 14 and 15°C in
the area, and the water temperature in the Tyrifjorden
lake was 14°C.
Study design
This is a retrospective observational study of available and
relevant anonymous data on (H)EMS activity during the
first 24 hours following the attacks of July 22, 2011. The
CONsensus Guidelines on Reports of Field Interventions
in Disasters and Emergencies (CONFIDE) was used in the
drafting of this epidemiological assessment [11]. The
heads of the involved prehospital services, the research
directors of both institutions (OUH and VVE) and the
Data Protection Official approved the data collection from
relevant sources within OUH and VVE. Because the Data
Protection Official and the research directors approved
the study as a quality improvement project, formal
approval from the Regional Committee for Medical and
Health Research Ethics was considered to be unnecessary.
Data sources and variables
The following data sources were screened for system
and patient characteristic descriptors as well as process
mapping variables [12] related to the prehospital EMS
in the first 24 hours following the bombing in Oslo and
the shootings at Utøya island:
￿ Communication log, Acute Medical Information
System (AMIS) (Nirvaco AS, Oslo, Norway) of the
EMCCs in Oslo, Akershus and Buskerud
￿ EMS operational data from OUH and VVE
￿ Flight log of Norwegian Air Ambulance
￿ Written reports from the prehospital EMS of OUH
and VVE
￿ Written reports from the OUH casualty clinic and
the OUH emergency department
￿ Data from the public domain regarding the inci-
dents in Oslo and at Utøya island and the prehospi-
tal EMS activity
All points of time are reported in Central European
Summer Time: GMT +2 (local time). Where a specific
time was not recorded in any records, the time was esti-
mated, and these times are reported as approximate.
Results
The Oslo government district scene
Table 2 shows an overview of the events related to the
EMS response following the bomb attack on the Oslo
government district with point of time.
Alarm, dispatch and initial response
The bomb in the Oslo government district detonated at
15:25. Within one minute, the Oslo EMCC received the
first call from the public regarding the explosion.
T w e l v ea m b u l a n c eu n i t si nt h ea r e aw e r ed i s p a t c h e d
and arrived on scene within minutes. Among the first
arriving units was the ambulance commander, who
assumed the role of ASC, and the physician-manned
ambulance, where the on-board anaesthesiologist
assumed the role of MSC.
The OUH-HEMS was dispatched 25 minutes after the
bomb detonated. The anaesthesiologists and the HEMS
paramedics of both OUH-HEMS crews went to the
scene via rapid response cars, whereas the pilots
shuttled several units of LESS stretcher bags [10] from
Table 2 Timeline of the EMS response to the Oslo government district bombing
Event Time
Oslo government district bomb detonates 15:25
Oslo EMCC receives first calls from the public regarding the bomb 15:26
First ambulance unit arrives on scene 15:28
First victim arrives on foot at Oslo casualty clinic 15:33
Ambulance Scene Commander declares a major incident 15:33
Civilian bus requisitioned by EMS at the bombsite 15:35
Both OUH-HEMS crews dispatched 15:40
First victim arrives at Oslo University Hospital Ullevål 15:51
Forty-one ambulance units available at casualty-clearing station 2 15:51
Seventh victim arrives at Oslo University Hospital Ullevål 16:10
One OUH-HEMS crew commissioned for SAR and triage in one of the bombed government buildings 16:40
Decommissioning of units from Oslo scene initiated 17:00
EMCC = Emergency Medical Communication Centre, EMS = Emergency Medical Service, OUH-HEMS = Helicopter Emergency Medical Service of Oslo University
Hospital, SAR = Search and Rescue
Sollid et al. Scandinavian Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency Medicine 2012, 20:3
http://www.sjtrem.com/content/20/1/3
Page 4 of 12the HEMS base to the scene by car. Additional person-
nel from OUH-HEMS were also called in and partici-
pated in the on-scene work. Two neighbouring HEMS
units (Arendal and Ål) were also dispatched for the inci-
dent in Oslo.
A total of 41 ambulance units and four HEMS units
were involved in the EMS activities following the Oslo
government district bombing. The EMCC of Oslo dis-
patched and controlled all the prehospital medical ser-
vices throughout the mission and coordinated the
allocation of health assets, in close corporation with the
ASC on site.
Triage and evacuation
Two casualty-clearing stations (Figure 2) were estab-
lished because no single evacuation corridor from the
scene could be established. Most victims were processed
through casualty-clearing station 2 (Figure 2).
The casualty clinic in Oslo received 64 victims from the
government district bombing site in the first two hours
following the attack. Only one of the victims treated at the
casualty clinic was admitted to hospital. In total, 12 trauma
victims were transported directly to hospitals in Oslo from
the bombing site, and 10 of them were transported to
OUH-U. All of the seriously injured victims were trans-
ported by ambulance. Casualties suffering from minor
injuries were also transported to the casualty clinic by
other vehicles, such as police cars, fire department vehicles
and a bus requisitioned by the EMS at the bombsite.
At 17:00, the situation was considered to be under con-
trol, and a decommissioning of ambulance resources from
Oslo was initiated. A heightened preparedness was
Figure 2 Map of the Oslo government district depicting the organisation of the EMS response and evacuation routes for ambulances.
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Page 5 of 12maintained, however, in case additional victims were
found and as a stand-by for the rescue personnel involved.
The Utøya island scene
Table 3 shows an overview of the events related to the
EMS response following the shooting at Utøya island
with point of time.
Alarm, dispatch and initial response
The first calls from victims at Utøya island to the
EMCC of Buskerud regarding the shooting were
received at 17:24. The first ambulance units were dis-
patched immediately but were held back when they
reached the Utøya area because the police had not
secured the area. The landside ferry quay of the Utøya
ferry (Utvika quay) was briefly declared secure a half
hour later, but the arriving ambulance units were soon
pulled back again when bullet impacts were observed in
the water nearby. The hotel at Sundvollen (Figure 1)
was temporarily chosen as the next clearing station for
victims arriving from Utøya island.
T h ef i r s tH E M Su n i tt oa r r i v ei nt h ea r e af l e wb y
U t ø y ai s l a n da t1 8 : 0 5b u tc o u l dn o tl a n do nt h ei s l a n d
because of the ongoing shooting. The other HEMS units
were routed to a deployment site on the main road
south of Utøya island. Because of a low cloud base and
fog in the Utøya island area, one HEMS unit deployed
by rapid response car directly from the Oslo scene.
Their helicopter was used to ferry four additional
HEMS physicians from OUH to the deployment site
south of Utøya island. In total, three intact HEMS units,
six additional HEMS physicians, two nurses and one
paramedic from OUH-HEMS and a number of ambu-
lance units were standing by at this deployment site.
Two additional HEMS units and two SAR helicopters
were still en route to the area. Several local ambulances
were already in the area, and more than 20 ambulances
and two ambulance buses had been released from OUH.
The EMCC of Buskerud dispatched and controlled all
the prehospital medical services throughout the Utøya
island mission and coordinated the allocation of health
assets, in close corporation with the ASCs on site.
Triage and evacuation
Soon after the shooting started, some of the victims with
no injuries or minor injures escaped the attacker at
Utøya island by swimming towards the mainland. The
first victims to reach the shore arrived scattered over a
large area and were attended to by civilians in nearby
houses as well as by ambulance personnel and a local
GP who by this time were located just above the Utvika
quay.
The first organised casualty-clearing station was estab-
lished at Utvika quay when police again declared the
area secure (Figure 3). Seven HEMS physicians, two
nurses, two local GPs and one anaesthesiologist
deployed from VVE engaged in triage on the shores of
the Utvika quay area together with ambulance personnel
Table 3 Timeline of the EMS response to the Utøya island shooting (estimated points of time in italics)
Event Time
Reports of shooting at Utøya island reaches Buskerud EMCC 17:24
First ambulance units dispatched by Buskerud EMCC 17:24
First EMS unit arrives near Utøya island 17:33
A major incident declared in VVE. 17:45
VVE hospitals Drammen and Ringerike activate their major incident plan (Asker Bærum already activated their major incident plan following
the Oslo bombing)
17:45
Utvika quay briefly declared secure by local police 17:55
First victims arrive on the mainland shores east of Utøya island 18:05
First HEMS unit arrives at deployment site south of Utøya island 18:10
Last HEMS unit arrives at deployment site south of Utøya island 18:25
First organised casualty-clearing station established at Utvika quay 18:50
Second casualty-clearing station established at Storøya 19:05
First EMS personnel arrive at Utøya island 19:40
First casualty-clearing station closed 19:45
First patient from Utøya island arrives at Oslo University Hospital Ullevål 19:57
Last patient from Utøya island arrives at Oslo University Hospital Ullevål 21:30
Last HEMS unit leaves secondary casualty-clearing station 22:20
Second casualty-clearing station closed 23:00
EMCC = Emergency Medical Communication Centre, EMS = Emergency Medical Service, HEMS = Helicopter Emergency Medical Service, VVE = Vestre Viken
Health Enterprise
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Page 6 of 12from multiple EMS systems. A local EMT acted as the
ASC at this site. Local police secured the area, and local
fire and rescue personnel assisted in patient care and
rescue. Victims from Utøya island were evacuated on
small private boats ferried by local civilians and tourists
from a nearby camping site. Most of these victims were
physically unhurt but some of them were mildly
hypothermic from swimming in the cold waters of Tyr-
ifjorden lake. An estimated number of 10 to 15 of the
victims who arrived on these boats in the initial phase
had suffered trauma from one or more gunshots. Nota-
bly, several of the injured had received crucial first aid
from other victims, ferryboat personnel and the police
before and during the transport across the lake. Apart
from triage for transport, the medical treatment was
limited to intravascular access and analgesia during the
primary survey. Two critically injured victims were intu-
bated, and one also received thoracic drainage en route
to the hospital. All injured victims assessed at Utvika
quay were transported directly to the nearest helicopter
Figure 3 Map of the Utøya island scene depicting the organisation of the EMS response and evacuation routes.
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Page 7 of 12evacuation point or hospital as soon as possible. In two
cases, physicians from the casualty-clearing station
accompanied the patient in the ambulance to continue
treatment en route to the helicopter evacuation point.
The location of the first casualty-clearing station was
close to the scene at Utøya island, but this location
proved to be ineffective for the further evacuation of
patients. The area was too small and narrow for helicop-
ters to land, and only a small, steep and narrow gravel
road connected it to the main road. Ambulances had to
drive backwards down the gravel road to pick up
patients, and in some cases, patients were carried up to
the main road to the waiting ambulances. The main
road, a narrow county road, was heavily congested with
ambulances, rescue vehicles and private vehicles and
made further evacuation difficult. A secondary casualty-
clearing station was therefore set up at the bridgehead
to Storøya island (Figure 3). This site was chosen
because it was a safe distance from the gunshots on
Utøya island, which was still unsecured, and because it
could accommodate a number of helicopters. One of
the OUH-HEMS physicians who arrived at this site with
ap a t i e n tf r o mt h eU t v i k aq u a ya c t e da st h eM S C ,a n d
this physician worked with the ASC from the local
ambulance service to organise triage, primary care and
transport for victims arriving directly from Utøya island
by boats and from the primary casualty-clearing station
at Utvika quay. Seven teams were organised with at
least one anaesthesiologist and one assistant in each
team. Six HEMS units, two SAR helicopters and 42
ambulances were available for transport. Figure 4 illus-
trates the patient evacuation routes from Utøya island
and from the Oslo government scene.
Approximately 60 flight movements were registered
during the Utøya island mission, with a peak of 30 in
one hour. Because of bad weather conditions, several
flights occurred under Instrument Flight Rules and used
the GPS-based instrument approach for the OUH-U
helipad.
The primary casualty-clearing station at the Utvika quay
area was evacuated again after less than one hour of
operation when the car of the perpetrator was discovered
in the area. Because the police could not rule out the pre-
sence of explosives in the car, all inbound victims were
Figure 4 Patient flow from both scenes to hospitals and institutions that received victims.
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victims already at the first casualty-clearing station were
evacuated. By this time, a team of one HEMS physician
and three paramedics had set course for Utøya island to
establish an advanced casualty-clearing station. The team
was initially denied access to the island by the police on
the island, but later, they were allowed ashore and were
followed by a second team of three HEMS physicians, one
physician from VVE, one nurse and two paramedics. The
team on the island remained under police protection
throughout the evening. Most of the victims passing
through this casualty-clearing station were physically
unhurt, but four victims with gunshot wounds were mana-
ged by the EMS group on Utøya island before evacuation.
The team was gradually reduced during the evening to
two HEMS physicians and three paramedics. This team
participated in a final search for survivors under police
protection after midnight, but no survivors were identified.
The team remained on the island until 01:30, when an
ambulance crew replaced them.
The HEMS units were gradually released from the
secondary casualty-clearing station after the last patient
was delivered at OUH-U. However, both OUH-HEMS
were dispatched for transferring patients from the local
hospitals to OUH-U during the night. The next day,
four more victims from the Utøya island shooting were
transferred by air to other hospitals in Norway: two by
helicopter and two by fixed-wing air ambulance.
The secondary casualty-clearing station was closed
between 22:30 and 23:00 but remained the base for SAR
personnel in the search for deceased victims in the lake
and the surrounding area through the night.
All seriously injured victims who were treated and
transported from the casualty-clearing stations were
alive upon arrival at the hospital. One victim subse-
quently succumbed to the injuries. Numerous uninjured
victims, their relatives and the relatives and friends of
the casualties were treated by local physicians and com-
munity health care employees who were gathered in the
hotel at Sundvolden. This service remained operative for
several days.
The perpetrator of the incidents in Oslo and on Utøya
island was apprehended on the island by police special
forces at 18:33. He did not resist arrest and was cap-
tured alive. Throughout the night, it remained unclear
whether there were further perpetrators on the island,
and the island was first declared safe the next day. The




The core of the prehospital efforts directly related to the
attacks took place over a pe r i o do f1 0h o u r s .T h et i m e
between the contact of the first victim with specialised
prehospital health resources and the evacuation of the
last victim was approximately one and a half hours in
the Oslo incident and two hours in the Utøya island
incident. The last victim was transported from the
Utøya island incident six hours after the bomb deto-
nated in Oslo. By this time, ground ambulances and
HEMS units from eight different health enterprises had
been involved in the efforts to treat and transport vic-
tims. Both scenes were organised according to the fra-
mework for the management, organisation and
coordination of mass casualty scenes [9]. With the
exception of the casualty-clearing station at Utvika quay,
all casualty-clearing stations in both incidents were
organised according to this framework. At Utvika quay,
t h er o l eo ft h eM S Cw a sn e v e rf o r m a l l ye s t a b l i s h e d .
However, because of the relatively large number of phy-
sicians with prehospital critical care competence avail-
able on the scene, triage appears to have been managed
successfully.
The prehospital challenges of July 22, 2011
Geography and EMS systems
Other terrorist attacks in recent years, including the
attacks in Istanbul in 2003 [13], Madrid in 2004 [14]
and London in 2005 [15], also presented with multiple
scenes, which creates a tremendous challenge for the
EMS systems. However, in contrast to these attacks,
which all occurred in urban areas with short transport
distances to hospitals, the scenes of the attacks of July
22, 2011 differed substantially in terms of geography,
infrastructure, EMS system and distance to specialised
health institutions. The attacks occurred within the
catchment areas of two different EMS systems and hos-
pital enterprises. Only the Utøya island scene occurred
in an area of overlap between the HEMS of OUH and
VVE, and OUH-U is the only hospital that covers both
scenes as the regional trauma centre of Southeast Nor-
way. These factors complicated the rescue efforts, but
the location of both scenes in the central regions of
Norway with a high density of prehospital and hospital
resources that were able to cooperate across enterprise
and system boundaries, somewhat mitigated these fac-
tors. Additionally, at the scene in Oslo, a relatively lim-
ited number of victims required specialised care, and
the excess EMS and HEMS resources in the region
could be reallocated when the Utøya island incident
started because the Oslo incident was de-escalating
concurrently.
Safety of the EMS personnel
EMS personnel in Norway are not required to operate
under conditions that can pose a threat to personal
safety. If ongoing violence is suspected, EMS personnel
are normally allowed to advance only after police
Sollid et al. Scandinavian Journal of Trauma, Resuscitation and Emergency Medicine 2012, 20:3
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Page 9 of 12declares the scene secured. In some scenarios, EMS per-
sonnel can enter an area with dedicated police protec-
tion, although the area has not been declared
completely secured. There is however little support for
the use of EMS personnel in such “hot zones“; the eva-
cuation of patients to “cold zones“ seems more effective
[16]. On both scenes on July 22, 2011, EMS units fol-
lowed police directions. On several occasions, EMS
units had to withdraw or evacuate because of security
concerns. No EMS units were issued special protective
gear, not even the personnel that operated on Utøya
island. The use of personal protective gear by EMS per-
sonnel, besides uniform and helmet, is not common in
such situations. In our opinion, the safety of the EMS
personnel involved was cared for, according to standard
operating procedures in the EMS systems involved.
Triage and evacuation
There is no standard for prehospital triage in Norway
[8], and to our knowledge, no single system was used
f o rt r i a g ei na n yo ft h es c e n e so nJ u l y2 2 ,2 0 1 1 .A l lv i c -
tims attended to by the HEMS and EMS were assessed
using the implemented principles for primary survey
adopted from Advanced Trauma Life Support [17] and
Prehospital Trauma Life Support [18]. The tagging of
victims was not performed because immediate transport
was possible as soon as the victims were evacuated to
the nearest casualty-clearing station. During the initial
hours of both incidents, large numbers of victims were
anticipated. Triage and evacuation plans were formed
with large numbers in mind. At the Utøya island scene,
a massive evacuation was planned and the use of other
regional hospitals was anticipated if OUH-U could not
absorb the patient load. It remains unclear whether a
unified system for triage in major incidents could have
changed the outcome or altered the decisions and plans
made on this day. In our opinion, triage and evacuation
was successful, since only the most seriously injured
were transported to the trauma centre of OUH-U and
no victims died before arriving hospital because of
delayed transport. We believe that the most important
factor that contributed to this seeming success was the
competence of the specialised prehospital personnel,
with their skills and knowledge of emergency medicine
and their knowledge of the EMS system and local hospi-
tal structure.
Patient flow and communication
Similarly to most incidents of this magnitude, the vic-
tims quickly spread over a large area. In the Oslo inci-
dent, the rapid control of victims in the outdoor areas
was achieved. The greatest challenge was determining
how many victims were still in the buildings and how to
evacuate them. The new encrypted digital radio system
helped to ensure stable radio communication between
resources and contributed to maintaining the control of
patient flow.
In the Utøya island incident, a large number of victims
evacuated themselves to the mainland in the first hour.
Local health personnel were spread out in this initial
phase, and although a meeting point had been desig-
nated at a hotel at Sundvollen, no organised casualty-
clearing station was established until approximately 80
minutes after the shooting started. Therefore, complete
control of all victims was impossible to obtain in the
first phase. The limited coverage and performance of
the old analogue emergency radio system in the area
contributed to some confusion about the location of the
casualty-clearing station and evacuation point at the
bridgehead to Storøya island. A few victims who were
triaged for direct transport to OUH-U were therefore
transported by ambulances to the local hospital, Ringer-
ike. In total, seven victims with severe gunshot injuries
arrived at Ringerike Hospital and were successfully
received and stabilised.
Emergency equipment
The overall impression is that sufficient medical equip-
ment was available at both scenes and that little equip-
ment was actually used because the focus was on rapid
triage and evacuation. The LESS stretchers [10] were
probably the most useful rescue equipment. At both
casualty-clearing stations in the Utøya island incident,
LESS stretchers were laid out in the patient arrival/
triage zone and stayed with the patients throughout the
evacuation, as intended. We believe that this process
helped to reduce patient discomfort and improved logis-
tics. The availability of LESS stretchers was limited,
however, because they are not available in all EMS
systems.
HEMS operations
None of the HEMS helicopters were involved in the
police operation at any of the scenes, and the police did
not request support from the civilian HEMS aviation
assets. The light HEMS helicopters were chosen as the
primary means of patient transport by air because of
their greater efficiency in operation, whereas the larger
SAR helicopters were held in stand-by for the transport
of large numbers of spontaneously breathing patients if
the patient load exceeded the capacity of the six HEMS
units. The greatest challenge in the HEMS operation
proved to be coordinating the helicopter activity in poor
weather conditions, uncontrolled airspace and an
unsettled security setting. In addition to the six HEMS
helicopters and two SAR helicopters, three additional
helicopters from the Royal Norwegian Air Force, one
police helicopter and two press helicopters were in the
area at different times. Despite these challenges, all
HEMS and SAR helicopters were able to communicate
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terns for landing and take-off near the casualty-clearing
station.
Limitations
The communications log (AMIS) of the EMCCs in Oslo
and Akershus failed as the result of overload, and most
of the data pertaining to the activities of OUH resources
were lost. The data presented in this article are there-
fore based largely on data from other sources. Accord-
ingly, the time sequences presented are not entirely
reliable. We believe, however, that our reconstruction is
fairly accurate.
The recordings of the patient flow in the initial phase
of the evacuation from both scenes were not complete.
In hindsight, all victims were accounted for, but in some
cases, the evacuation points from which specific indivi-
duals were evacuated are still unclear. A reconstruction
of these events would probably have been possible from
interviews with the victims, the EMS personnel and the
police. However, such an extensive data collection pro-
cess was not within the scope of this descriptive study.
Conclusion
The terrorist attacks in Norway on July 22, 2011 elicited
a massive prehospital response involving units from
eight different health enterprises. Despite the occurrence
of two scenes within a short time span and with a sig-
nificant geographical distance between them, a large
number of EMS and HEMS resources from different
systems could be activated and utilised. The time to
treatment was delayed for many victims at the Utøya
island because of safety concerns and geographical chal-
lenges. However, we believe that the EMS response was
successful under the given conditions. The lack of a
robust radio communication system at the Utøya island
scene and the breakdown of the communications log
(AMIS) are issues that need to be addressed. We also
believe that the experiences warrant a “common lan-
guage” in the management of major incidents, perhaps
in the form of a national standard major incident triage.
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